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Transsaccadic Representation of Layout: What Is the 
Time Course of Boundary Extension? 







How rapidly does boundary extension occur? Across experiments, trials included a 3-scene 
sequence (325 ms/picture), masked interval, and repetition of 1 scene. The repetition was the 
same view or differed (more close-up or wide angle). Observers rated the repetition as same as, 
closer than, or more wide angle than the original view on a 5-point scale. Masked intervals were 
100, 250, 625, or 1,000 ms in Experiment 1 and 42, 100, or 250 ms in Experiments 2 and 3. 
Boundary extension occurred in all cases: Identical views were rated as too “close-up,” and 
distractor views elicited the rating asymmetry typical of boundary extension (wider angle 
distractors were rated as being more similar to the original than were closer up distractors). 
Most important, boundary extension was evident when only a 42-ms mask separated the 
original and test views. Experiments 1 and 3 included conditions eliciting a gaze shift prior to the 
rating test; this did not eliminate boundary extension. Results show that boundary extension is 
available soon enough and is robust enough to play an on-line role in view integration, perhaps 
supporting incorporation of views within a larger spatial framework. 
 
  
We can never see the surrounding visual world all at once. 
Instead, we must sample it a part at a time through successive 
movements of the eyes and head. An interesting aspect of memory 
for a single view of a scene is that it will often be remembered as 
having shown more of the scene than was available in the sensory 
information— observers remember seeing beyond the edges of the 
view. This is referred to as boundary extension (Intraub & Richardson, 
1989). Although boundary extension is an error with 
respect to the stimulus, it provides a good prediction of the world 
beyond the view. For this reason, it has been suggested that 
boundary extension might serve an adaptive function in scene 
representation by placing each view within its larger spatial framework 
(Intraub, 2002, 2007; Intraub, Bender, & Mangels, 1992). 
 
This hypothesis has received support from both behavioral and 
neuroimaging data. Behavioral research has shown that boundary 
extension is not present in memory for all pictures of objects (e.g., 
an object on a blank background) but only for those in which the 
background depicts part of the visual world (i.e., scene layout; 
Gottesman & Intraub, 2002, 2003; Intraub, Gottesman, & Bills, 
1998). A similar distinction between pictures that include scene 
layout and those that do not is reflected in the heightened neural 
responses of the parahippocampal place area to pictures of scene 
layout (Epstein & Kanwisher, 1998). More recently, an fMRI 
study of brain activation in the presence of boundary extension 
revealed that indeed the parahippocampal place area was highly 
activated when boundary extension occurred (Park, Intraub, Yi, 
Widders, & Chun, 2007). These experiments indicate that boundary 
extension is part of the representation of scene layout. The 
purpose of the present research is to determine the early time 
course of boundary extension. Specifically, at what stage of processing 
does boundary extension occur? 
 
In the typical experiment, short series of photographs were 
presented for multisecond durations (e.g., 15 s each), and memory 
was tested minutes to 48 hr later (e.g., Candel, Merckelbach, & 
Zandbergen, 2003; Gottesman & Intraub, 2002; Intraub et al., 
1992, 1998; Intraub & Richardson, 1989; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2004). The results suggested that boundary extension might be a 
long-term phenomenon. In fact, Koriat, Goldsmith, and Pansky 
(2000), in their review of memory errors, grouped boundary extension 
with memory errors for text in which “. . . schematic 
knowledge is used to make inferences and suppositions that go 
beyond the actual input event” (p. 494). They noted that schemainduced 
errors such as these tend to increase over time as memory 
becomes less detailed. If boundary extension requires long retention 
times to occur, then it could not play a role on-line during 
visual scanning. It might be the case that at the earliest stages of 
processing (e.g., between fixations), visual memory for a justfixated 
view might be strong enough to maintain fairly veridical 
boundaries. 
However, an experiment described in Previc and Intraub (1997) 
demonstrated, somewhat surprisingly, that boundary extension did 
occur rapidly enough to be observed across a series of perception/ 
action cycles during drawing. Observers viewed four photographs 
for 15 s each and then drew them from memory. Another group 
drew them from a projected image on a screen at the front of the 
room. As expected, boundary extension occurred in the memory 
group. What was striking was that boundary extension also occurred 
in drawings made by observers who could see the photographs. 
Does this mean that boundary extension occurs during 
perception? 
 
To answer this question it is important to consider the task 
carefully. While an observer is literally looking at a picture, he or 
she can see where the picture ends, and can imagine what would 
likely exist in the world beyond the edges of the view. Both the 
sensory information and the expected layout beyond the edges are 
part of the observer’s representation. Unlike well-known perceptual 
illusions (e.g., the Mueller-Lyer illusion), boundary extension 
does not occur while the stimulus is in view. However, when 
drawing, observers did not maintain fixation on the projected 
image. They shifted their gaze from the projected image to the 
paper on their desks, thus relying on memory of the view while 
they drew. They occasionally would look up and sample the image 
then look down and draw again, alternating between sensory 
perception and memory. This suggests that boundary extension 
occurred at least within seconds after the sensory image was gone, 
while the observer was drawing. 
 
Consistent with this observation, Intraub, Gottesman, Willey, 
and Zuk (1996) demonstrated that boundary extension occurs for 
photographs presented in brief rapid serial visual presentation 
(RSVP) sequences when memory was tested for the last item in the 
sequence only 1 s later (see also Bertamini, Jones, Spooner, & 
Hecht, 2005). Given these results, two possibilities are clear. First, 
boundary extension might occur a second or more following offset 
of the stimulus, suggesting it is a very short-term memory error— 
not rapid enough to play a role in transsaccadic memory but 
available soon after perception. Alternately, boundary extension 
might occur as soon as the sensory input is gone. Rather than 
occurring “in memory,” it might instead be part of the unfolding 
process of scene perception, which involves a rapidly changing 
cycle of sensory perception and memory. 
 
If boundary extension is available during the time between 
saccades (i.e., transsaccadic memory; see Irwin, 1991, 1993), 
then we would expect to see it under the following three 
conditions. First, it should occur following a brief glimpse of 
a scene (analogous to the duration of a single fixation). Boundary 
extension is known to occur following presentations as 
brief as 250 ms and 333 ms (Bertamini et al., 2005; Intraub et 
al., 1996; 500 ms: Intraub, Hoffman, Wetherhold, & Stoehs, 
2006). Second, it should be evident following a gap in sensory 
input commensurate with a “typical” saccade (on the order of 
30 –50 ms; Rayner, 1998). However, retention times briefer 
than 1 s have not been tested. Third, boundary extension 
would need to survive a gaze shift caused by a change in 
the position of the eyes or the head. Recent research shows that 
boundary extension occurs following a single eye movement 
when memory is tested 2 s later (Intraub et al., 2006), but it is 
not known whether it occurs when tested immediately after a 
gaze shift. It is possible that the process of planning and 
executing a gaze shift might delay the onset of boundary 
extension for a couple of seconds, thus preventing its inclusion 
in transsaccadic memory. 
 
 
EARLY MEMORY BUFFERS 
 
Might early memory buffers prevent boundary extension? It 
may be that early visual buffers maintain a fairly veridical representation 
of layout, essentially protecting the representation from 
distortions. Iconic memory has been categorized as a highcapacity, 
brief-duration, veridical buffer that is disrupted by masking 
by both luminance and pattern. So, for example, if a single 
fixation on a scene were followed by a fixation on an empty region 
of space, a veridical representation of the spatial expanse of that 
view might be maintained in an iconic representation (i.e., as 
informational persistence) for 100–300 ms (Irwin & Brown, 1987; 
Irwin & Yeomans, 1986). 
 
What if, however, a single fixation on a view of a scene is 
followed by another fixation whose contents would disrupt an 
iconic representation, or alternatively, what if an iconic representation 
isn’t maintained across a gaze shift? Visual short-term 
memory (VSTM) has been categorized as a longer lasting (i.e., 
multisecond) buffer that does not maintain a literal copy of the 
physical visual stimulus (i.e., it is not a point-by-point copy) and 
that is capacity limited but not disrupted by visual masking (Irwin, 
1991; Phillips, 1974). Numerous studies suggest that VSTM representations 
are not literal copies of the display (Gordon & Irwin, 
1996; Henderson, 1994; Hollingworth, Hyun, & Zhang, 2005; 
Irwin, 1991, 1992; Irwin & Andrews, 1996; Olson & Jiang, 2004; 
Phillips, 1974). This does not imply, however, that VSTM representations 
contain no visual information. Here we ask whether 
VSTM might maintain a veridical representation for a brief interval 








Might gaze shifts delay boundary extension? If boundary extension 
occurs rapidly enough to support view integration on-line, it 
would not be of use unless it could also survive a shift in gaze. In 
prior boundary extension research, stimulus and test views have 
always been presented in the same physical location. Might the 
demands of attention and/or motor systems engaged during gaze 
shifts early in processing either delay the onset of boundary 
extension or cause memory for boundaries simply to be poor— 
causing errors but not the strong unidirectional error that characterizes 
boundary extension? Numerous studies have demonstrated 
that gaze shifts suppress a variety of cognitive processes, whereas 
others appear to continue across them unimpeded (for a review, see 
Irwin & Brockmole, 2004). A brief examination of the known 
properties of transsaccadic memory might shed some light on 
whether boundary extension might be included in transsaccadic 
memory. 
 
Most experiments on transsaccadic memory have focused not on 
scenes as a whole, but on the properties of individual objects that 
are remembered across a saccade. In general, results suggest that 
representations of structural descriptions of objects are retained 
(Carlson-Radvansky, 1999; Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1995; 
Verfaillie & De Graef, 2000; Verfaillie, De Troy, & Van Rensbergen, 
1994), but there is also evidence for retention of specific 
visual information (object orientation: Henderson & Siefert, 1999, 
2001; but not detailed object contours: Henderson, 1997). 
Boundary extension, however, involves an extrapolation of layout. 
Although the literature on transsaccadic memory has not 
focused on scene layout, there have been several studies that have 
focused on retention of spatial relations. These provide evidence 
that spatial information is available in transsaccadic memory. It 
has been shown that information that specifies the structural relations 
of parts of a single object is included in a transsaccadic 
representation (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1995). In addition, 
information about the configuration, or the spatial relations among 
different objects, can also be represented (Carlson-Radvansky, 
1999; Deubel, 2004; Germeys, de Graef, Panis, van Eccelpoel, & 
Verfaillie, 2004). The question we ask is whether this transsaccadic 
representation includes extrapolated layout (boundary extension) 




THE CURRENT EXPERIMENTS 
 
To explore the early time course of boundary extension and test 
its resiliency to shifts in gaze, in all three experiments we used 
Intraub et al.’s (1996) three-picture RSVP method. Three pictures 
were presented for 325 ms each in a continuous sequence followed 
by a masked retention interval and subsequent boundary memory 
test. There were three reasons for choosing this method. First, by 
embedding a target picture in a rapidly changing series, we could 
approximate the dynamic nature of visual scanning.1 Second, the 
design allowed us to test boundary memory following presentations 
of 0, 1, or 2 intervening items, thus allowing us to determine 
if factors such as conceptual masking (Intraub, 1984; Potter, 1976) 
during successive presentation might influence boundary extension. 
Third, the rapidity of input coupled with observer uncertainty 
about which picture would be tested would minimize the observer’s 
ability to develop verbal strategies (e.g., “the man’s head is .5 
cm from the top”) for remembering boundary placement over the 
course of the session. 
 
In all three experiments, on each trial, the observer was required 
to rate the repeated scene as being the same view or a more 
close-up or wide-angle view than before on a 5-point scale (Intraub 
& Richardson, 1989). Across experiments the interval between 
offset of the last picture and onset of the test picture was always 
masked and it ranged between 42 ms (comparable to the duration 
of a saccade) and 1 s (to replicate earlier research). To test the 
effect of a shift in gaze on boundary extension, in Experiments 1, 
3a, and 3b, test pictures were presented either in the same location 
as the RSVP sequence or to the left or right side of the screen. 
Depending on the experiment, when a scene repeated it could be 
the same, a more close-up view, or a more wide-angle view than 
one of the pictures in the presentation sequence. In this way, all the 
patterns of response that are diagnostic of boundary extension 
could be addressed following each masked interval. These patterns 
have been replicated in many studies (e.g., Bertamini et al., 2005; 
Gottesman & Intraub, 2002; Intraub et al., 1992, 1998; Intraub & 
Richardson, 1989). The three patterns of interest are as follows: 
 
1. When the target picture and test picture are identical 
close-ups, observers tend to reject the test picture as 
being the same, reporting instead that it is more close-up 
than the target picture, thus indicating that the target 
picture was remembered with extended boundaries. This 
was tested in Experiments 1–3. 
 
2. Target pictures that are tight close-ups yield more boundary 
extension than wider angle views of the same scene; 
in fact, wider angle views tend to yield no directional 
distortion (see Gottesman & Intraub, 2002; Intraub et al., 
1992; Intraub & Berkowits, 1996). This was tested in 
Experiment 2. 
 
3. When a close-up is the target and a wider view is presented 
at test, observers rate the pair as being more 
similar than when the reverse is the case. This is because 
boundary extension for a closer target causes it to be 
remembered as looking more like the wider angle test 
picture. This asymmetry was also observed in neural 
responses to dissimilar pictures in scene-selective brain 
regions (Park et al., 2007). This signature pattern was 





In Experiment 1 boundary extension was tested for a single 
picture immediately following a three-picture RSVP sequence and 
a masked interval of 1 s, 625 ms, 250 ms, or 100 ms. We selected 
the latter three intervals as coarse divisions of the 1-s interval after 
which boundary extension is known to occur (Bertamini et al., 
2005; Intraub et al., 1996). To provide the most sensitive test of 
boundary extension, on half the trials the same close-up served as 
both target and test picture. Thus, in the critical case for testing 
time course (when the target picture is in the final serial position 
of the RSVP sequence), the same close-up view of a complex 
scene was interrupted by a 100-ms masked interval. To ensure that 
observers were focused on the task and were using the scale 
appropriately, on the remaining trials scenes were divided into two 
sets: In one a close-up target was tested with a more wide-angle 
view of the same scene, and in the other, a wider angle view was 
tested with a close-up version. 
 
Finally, to determine if boundary extension survives a gaze shift 
between the target picture and the test picture, the test picture 
appeared equally often in the same location as the target (center 
screen) or shifted to the right or left side of the screen. If boundary 
extension does not occur at intervals briefer than 1 s, or if a gaze 
shift disrupts the extrapolation of expected surrounding space, then 
boundary extension cannot play an on-line role in view integration 





Participants. A total of 144 University of Delaware undergraduates, 
fulfilling a requirement for an introductory psychology 
course, participated in the experiment. All reported having normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and normal color vision. 
Apparatus. All stimuli were presented on a 21” flat-screen 
CRT monitor in 32-bit color at a resolution of 1024 x768 pixels 
and a refresh rate of 120 Hz that was driven by a video card with 
128 MB of video memory. Stimulus presentation was controlled 
by a Pentium-based PC running Microsoft Windows XP. The 
software was based on a template program supplied by SR Research 
(Mississauga, Ontario, Canada) written in C that used 
Simple DirectMedia Layer (SDL) Version 1.2.9 to access the 
video hardware. The viewing distance was approximately 80 cm, 
and on average pictures subtended 9.2° x 10.2° of visual angle 
(widths ranged from 5.9° to 13.7°; heights ranged from 8.9° to 
10.4°). 
 
Stimuli. Stimuli were 96 color photographs that depicted people 
engaging in various activities, for example, a football player 
kicking a football, a man tossing a pizza, and a couple dancing. 
Some of the images were copied, with permission, from the Big 
Box of Art 615,000 Images database of royalty-free images 
(Hemera Technologies); others were downloaded from the Internet. 
All stimuli were presented on a gray background. Of the 96 
pictures, 32 served as targets (i.e., to-be-tested pictures: 2 in the 
practice trials and 30 in the experimental trials). The other 64 
pictures served as fillers in the presentation sequence (i.e., the two 
nontarget pictures in the RSVP triad). A given scene (close or wide 
version) was always presented with the same filler items. Each 
target scene could be presented in its close-up version or its more 
wide-angle version, as is illustrated in Figure 1. Close-ups were 
created by enlarging the wide-angle version by 8–21% in area and 
then cropping the enlarged version to be the same size as the 
original. Thus, both versions were the same size, but the wideangle 
version showed a larger amount of background surrounding 





Figure 1. A close-up version of a target picture is shown on the left, and 
a wider angle version of the same target picture is shown on the right. (All 
pictures that were used as targets in Experiment 1 were downloaded from 
the Internet. To protect against copyright infringement, we show an example 
used in Experiments 2 and 3 only, which comes from the Big Box of Art  
615,000 Images database, Hemera Technologies. In the public domain.) 
Design and procedure. A depiction of a trial sequence is 
shown in Figure 2. Each self-initiated trial began with a central 
fixation point that remained on screen for 500 ms. The RSVP 
sequence followed (325 ms/picture) in the center of the screen. The 
target picture appeared equally often in Serial Position 1, 2, or 3. 
Observers did not know which picture would ultimately be tested. 
The RSVP sequence was immediately followed by a masked 
interval of 100, 250, 625, or 1000 ms (between groups). For a 
target picture that appeared in Serial Position 3, the retention 
interval would be the same as the duration of the masked interval; 
for target pictures presented earlier in the sequence, the retention 
interval would be equal to the duration of the masked interval plus 
the duration of the picture or pictures that followed it. Observers 







Figure 2. A schematic illustration of a trial sequence with the test picture in the center of the screen 
(maintain-fixation condition). Note that the actual stimuli did not fill the screen, as is shown in the 
example. (All images, with the exception of the mask image, are from the Big Box of Art 615,000 Images 






The mask was a pattern mask that filled the screen and had a 
dynamically changing central portion. As is shown in Figure 2, the 
central component was a schematic face that subtended 5.5° _ 
5.5° of visual angle. A sequence of four different faces was shown, 
and each face was visible for either 150 ms or was terminated 
when the masked interval ended. The repeated onsets were intended 
to minimize implicit verbalization and keep the observers’ 
eyes on the center of the screen before the test picture appeared. At 
the end of the masked interval, the test picture was shown either in 
the display’s center (referred to as maintain-fixation trials) or to 
the left or right of center (referred to as shift-gaze trials), shifted by 
an average of 5.8° (ranging from 4.2° to 7.4°). It appeared equally 
often at each location, without warning. On trials in which the test 
picture appeared in a different location than the RSVP sequence, 
the interval between the offset of the final picture in the RSVP 
sequence and the beginning of an observer’s first fixation on the 
test picture would be defined by the time required for the observer 
to shift his or her gaze to the test picture following its onset. 
Otherwise, this interval would be equal to the masked interval. 
Observers were asked to rate whether the test picture showed the 
same view, a more close-up view, or a more wide-angle view than 
before using a 5-point Likert scale. The alternatives (and their corresponding 
numerical values) were “much closer up (–2),” “a little 
closer up (–1),” “the same (0),” “a little farther away (1),” and “much 
farther away (2).” The test picture was visible until the observer 
clicked one of these choices with the mouse. Observers then indicated 
how confident they were about their response by clicking “sure (3),” 
“pretty sure (2),” “not sure (1),” or “don’t remember that picture (0).” 
The fixation point for the next trial then appeared and the observer 
initiated the trial by clicking the mouse. 
 
There were a total of 30 trials. On 15 trials the target and test 
picture were identical close-ups (referred to as CC trials). On 14 
trials the target and test picture were different views of the same 
scene; half the time a close-up was the target and the test picture 
was a more wide-angle view (CW trials) and half the time the 
reverse was true (WC trials). Each target picture was tested in only 
one of these conditions across observers. The 30th trial was always 
a “dummy” trial in which the target picture was tested with the 
same view. This trial had to be added to allow us to show each 
target at each serial position equally often across observers, while 
at the same time having an equal number of CW and WC trials. 
Responses made on this trial were not included in the analyses. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Observers were rather confident of their ratings; on average, 
21%, 57%, and 20% of their responses were rated as “sure,” 
“pretty sure,” and “not sure,” respectively. They reported not 
recognizing the test picture on only 2% of the trials, and these 
were excluded from all analyses. A 4 x 2 (Masked interval _ 
Side of display) mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
comparing observers’ mean boundary ratings for test pictures 
presented on the left versus right side of the screen revealed no 
main effect of location, F(1, 140) = 1.73, ns, and no interaction 
with the masked interval, F < 1. Observers’ mean boundary 
ratings in these two conditions were subsequently collapsed 
across this factor. 
 
Critical CC trials: Targets and test pictures are identical closeups. 
Figure 3 (left panel) shows the mean boundary rating at each 
serial position (collapsed over the spatial position of the test 
picture). The 95% confidence intervals revealed that boundary 
extension occurred at each serial position for each masked interval. 
Thus, boundary extension occurred even at the briefest interval 
tested—when the final picture in a sequence was repeated only 100 
ms later. To determine if the size of the boundary extension effect 
was influenced by the duration of the masked interval, a 3 _ 4 
(Serial position _ Retention interval) mixed-design ANOVA was 
conducted. It revealed no main effect of the masked interval’s 
duration, F(3, 140) _ 1.16, ns; no effect of serial position, F _ 1; 
and no interaction, F _ 1. The lack of a serial position effect 
shows that the onset of new meaningful pictures during RSVP did 
not disrupt incorporation of the extrapolated region into the spatial 
representation of the scenes—that is, there was no effect of conceptual 





Figure 3. Observers’ mean boundary ratings for each serial position of the target (collapsed across spatial 
position of the test picture) are shown on the left, and mean boundary ratings for each spatial position of 
the test picture (center, side; collapsed across serial position of the target) are shown on the right, for 
each retention interval (Experiment 1). Error bars show the 95% confidence interval of the mean. Means 
that are significantly less than zero reflect boundary extension; means that are significantly greater than 
zero reflect boundary restriction. 
Figure 3 (right panel) shows the mean boundary rating as a 
function of the spatial location of the test picture for each masked 
interval (collapsed over serial position). As shown by the 95% 
confidence intervals in the figure, boundary extension occurred 
whether or not a shift in gaze intervened between presentation and 
test. Observers were never forewarned about the location of the 
test picture, yet when it shifted away from center screen, the 
concomitant gaze shift had no inhibitory effect on boundary extension. 
The expanded representation of layout clearly survived the 
shift in attention and subsequent gaze shift, suggesting that boundary 






Figure 4. Observers’ mean boundary ratings (collapsed across both serial position of the target and 
spatial position of the test picture) for trials on which a close-up target was tested by wide-angle view are 
shown on the left, and mean boundary ratings for trials on which a wide-angle target was tested by close-
up view are shown on the right, for each retention interval (Experiment 1). Error bars show the 95% 





CW and WC Trials. The mean boundary ratings for CW and 
WC trials (collapsed over serial position and spatial position) 
for each masked interval are shown in Figure 4 (left and right 
panels, respectively). Observers were able to recognize the 
presence of distractors and were clearly using the scale appropriately. 
Consistent with the occurrence of boundary extension, 
the right panel of Figure 4 shows that observers were quite good 
at recognizing when the test picture was more close-up than the 
target, whereas the left panel shows that more wide-angle test 




Experiment 1 showed that a 100-ms interruption was sufficient 
to elicit boundary extension. In Experiment 2 we decreased the 
briefest interval further to 42 ms (commensurate with a saccade); 
intervals tested were 250 ms, 100 ms, and 42 ms. To enhance the 
observer’s ability to retain a veridical representation, the RSVP 
sequence and test picture were always in the same location (center 
screen). In addition, we sought to obtain converging evidence for 
boundary extension through implementation of a design used in 
many prior boundary extension studies (e.g., Intraub et al., 1998; 
Intraub & Richardson, 1989), in which targets were either close-up 
or wide-angle views of a scene, and the test picture was either the 
same view as the target or its complement. This yielded four 
different test conditions: (a) close-up view tested with the same 
close-up view (CC trials), (b) wide-angle view tested with the 
same wide-angle view (WW trials), (c) close-up view tested with 
the wide-angle version of the scene (CW trials), and (d) wide-angle 
view tested with the close-up version of the scene (WC trials). 
Scenes were counterbalanced across these four conditions. In this 
way we could determine if all three patterns that are diagnostic of 
boundary extension (i.e., boundary extension for CC trials, little or 
none for WW trials, and a CW–WC asymmetry, as discussed in the 





Participants. A total of 108 University of Delaware undergraduate 
students, fulfilling a research participation requirement 
for an introductory psychology course, participated in the experiment. 
All reported having normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and normal color vision, and none participated in the previous 
experiment. 
Apparatus and stimuli. The apparatus and stimuli were the 
same as in the previous experiment with the exception of the 
following differences. In the current experiment there were a total 
of 114 pictures of real-world scenes used, with 38 serving as 
targets and the remaining 76 serving as fillers for the presentation 
sequences. Here we added 6 new sequences to the 32 sequences 
used in the previous experiment. 
 
Procedure and design. The procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 1 with the exception that all stimuli and test pictures 
were presented in the center of the screen. There were a total of 36 
trials. On half the trials, the target was a close-up view; on the 
other half, it was a wide-angle view. Within each of these conditions, 
on half of the trials the test picture was the same view as the 
target picture (CC, WW); on the other half, it was a different (i.e., 
the other) view (CW, WC). This yielded 9 trials for each target 
view–test view combination. Within each of these four target–test 
combinations, the target picture appeared in Serial Positions 1, 2, 
and 3 of the initial presentation equally often, yielding 3 trials per 
cell of the design. Across observers, every target picture appeared 
in each of these conditions equally often. Each observer was tested 
with only one of the three masked intervals (42, 100, and 250 ms), 
with 36 observers being tested with each masked interval. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
As in Experiment 1, observers were rather confident, rating their 
responses as “sure,” “pretty sure,” and “not sure” on 27.5%, 53%, 
and 17%, of the trials respectively. They failed to recognize test 
pictures on only 2.5% of the trials, and these were excluded from 
all analyses. 
 
Boundary extension ratings for the final picture in each sequence. 
To examine the early time course of boundary extension, 
here we focus on those trials on which the target picture appeared 
in Serial Position 3. All three patterns consistent with boundary 
extension were obtained. First, as in Experiment 1, CC trials 
yielded boundary extension at all masked intervals— even the 
42-ms masked interval. Figure 5 shows the mean boundary rating 
and 95% confidence interval for each serial position at each 
masked interval. The upper left panel shows that CC trials yielded 
boundary extension at each masked interval. Thus, the results 
show that on average, a 42-ms interruption in the sensory input 
was sufficient to prevent observers from recognizing the repetition 
of a close-up view—instead, they remembered the first presentation 
as having extended boundaries. 
 
 
Figure 5. Observers’ mean boundary ratings for CC trials are shown on the upper left, mean boundary 
ratings for WW trials are shown on the upper right, mean boundary ratings for CW trials are shown on the 
lower left, and mean boundary ratings for WC trials are shown on the lower right, for each serial position 
of the target at each retention interval (Experiment 2). Error bars show the 95% confidence interval of the 
mean. For CC and WW trials, means that are significantly less than zero reflect boundary extension; 




Second, wide-angle views yielded less boundary extension than 
their close-up counterparts. The mean boundary ratings for WW 
trials for each masked interval are shown in Figure 5 (upper right 
panel). A 3 x 2 (Masked interval x Test type) mixed-design 
ANOVA on observers’ mean boundary ratings revealed that CC 
trials yielded more boundary extension than WW trials, F(1, 
105) = 12.36, p < .05, partial n2 = .11, and the lack of interaction 
with masked interval duration (F < 1) indicates that this same 
pattern occurred for each masked interval. 
Third, a robust asymmetry in responses to the CW and WC 
trials, as is shown in Figure 5 (lower left and right panels), 
provides strong additional support that boundary extension was 
occurring at these intervals. The same pair of pictures was rated 
differently (with respect to how different they were from one 
another) depending on their order (close-up first or wide angle 
first). A 3 x 2 (Masked interval x Test type) mixed ANOVA on 
the absolute value of the mean boundary scores on CW and WC 
trials revealed a main effect of test type, F(1, 105) = 40.81, p < 
.05, partial n2 = .28, indicating that CW test pictures were rated as 
being closer to “same” than were WC test pictures. The lack of an 
interaction with masked interval duration, F(2, 105) = 1.57, ns, 
again indicates that this same pattern occurred for each masked 
interval. Taken together, these patterns suggest that boundary 
extension is part of the mental representation of a scene very 
rapidly after stimulus offset. They also suggest that boundary 
extension occurs rapidly enough to be available from one fixation 
to the next. 
 
We also found that more boundary extension occurred for the 
longest masked interval than for the shortest one. A one-way 
ANOVA on mean boundary ratings for CC trials revealed a main 
effect of masked interval duration, F(2, 105) = 3.31, p < .05, 
partial n2  = .06, and planned comparisons revealed that mean 
ratings for the 250-ms interval were larger than mean ratings for 
the 42-ms interval (–.47 vs. –.19), t(70) = 2.69, p < .05. This 
small difference could have been the result of a fading visual 
representation that was attenuating boundary extension at the 
shortest interval. The results of a recent experiment, however, 
suggest that this difference may be related to the memory load 
resulting from the three-picture stimulus sequences (Intraub & 
Dickinson, 2006). When we presented observers with only a single 
stimulus for 250 ms and then tested their memories for the views 
(using the same procedure as in the current experiment), we found 
no difference in the amount of boundary extension that occurred 
following 42-ms and 250-ms masked intervals. 
 
Boundary extension ratings for pictures in Serial Positions 1 
and 2. Analysis of responses to pictures in Serial Positions 1 and 
2 showed that boundary extension was not eliminated by the onset 
of new pictures (i.e., conceptual masking; Potter, 1976). The same 
three critical data patterns diagnostic of boundary extension occurred 
on these trials. First, as is shown in the upper left panel of 
Figure 5, CC trials yielded boundary extension at all masked 
intervals. Second, a 3 x 2 x 2 (Masked interval x Test type x 
Serial position) mixed ANOVA comparing mean boundary ratings 
on CC trials and on WW trials revealed that less boundary extension 
occurred for WW trials than for CC trials, F(1, 105) = 27.39, 
p < .05, partial n2  = .21. There was no significant interaction of 
test type with either masked interval, F(2, 105) = 1.03, ns, or serial 
position, F(1, 105) = 2.80, ns, indicating that this pattern occurred 
at each serial position and each masked interval. Third, a 3 x 2 x 
2 (Masked interval x Test type x Serial position) mixed ANOVA 
on the absolute value of the mean boundary scores on CW and WC 
trials revealed a main effect of test type, F(1, 105) = 59.74, p < 
.05, partial n2  = .36. Further, this main effect of test type did not 
interact with either masked interval, F < 1, or with serial position, 
F < 1, indicating that this asymmetry occurred at each serial 
position and each masked interval. 
 
 
EXPERIMENTS 3A AND 3B 
 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that boundary extension occurs rapidly 
enough to play a role in view integration during visual 
scanning. In Experiments 3a and 3b, we therefore returned to the 
question of whether or not a shift in gaze would influence boundary 
extension. In Experiment 3a, as in Experiment 2, the masked 
intervals tested were 250 ms, 100 ms, and 42 ms. Test pictures 
were presented in either the same spatial location as the RSVP 
sequence or in a different (nonoverlapping) location. In Experiment 
3b, we recorded observers’ eye movements to determine the 
extent to which they were maintaining central fixation during 
stimulus presentation and to determine the duration of the saccade-defined 
interval between the end of the stimulus sequence and the 
beginning of observers’ first fixations on the test items in shift-gaze 
trials. 
 
All trials were CC trials (close-ups tested with close-ups). Unlike 
Experiment 1, position of the test picture was blocked so that 
observers always knew where the test picture would appear. We 
reasoned that by eliminating this uncertainty we would maximize 
our ability to detect any subtle influences of a gaze shift on 
memory for the expanse of a view. To determine if the time 
between the offset of the last picture and the beginning of the 
saccade would influence boundary extension, we included the 
same three masked intervals as in Experiment 3a. The end of the 





Participants. In Experiment 3a, 108 University of Delaware 
undergraduate students, fulfilling a research participation requirement 
for an introductory psychology course, participated. In Experiment 
3b, 36 individuals (5 college graduates who were paid 
$8/hour and 31 students) participated. All reported having normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision and normal color vision, and none 
participated in either of the previous experiments. 
 
Apparatus and stimuli. The apparatus was the same as in the 
previous experiment. The stimuli included only the close-up versions 
of targets and test pictures from the previous experiment. In 
Experiment 3b, we used an EyeLink II video-based eye tracking 
system to collect eye movement data (SR Research; Mississauga, 
Ontario, Canada). Eye position was sampled at 500 Hz, the system’s 
spatial resolution was estimated to be less than 0.4°, and 
head position and viewing distance were fixed with a chinrest. 
 
Design and procedure. There were a total of 36 trials. Stimuli 
and test pictures were shown on either the left side or right side of 
the screen; no items were presented in the screen’s center, and 
there was no spatial overlap between the stimulus sequence and the 
test picture when they appeared on different sides of the screen. 
When the two were presented in different locations, the average 
center-to-center distance was 11.8° (ranging from 8.4° to 14.2°). 
On half of the trials, the test picture was shown on the same side 
of the screen as the stimulus sequence (maintain-fixation trials); on 
the other half, it was presented on the other side of the screen 
(shift-gaze trials). Within each of these conditions, on half of the 
trials the stimulus sequence was presented on the left side of the 
screen; on the other half, it was presented on the right side. This 
yielded 9 trials for each stimulus side–test side combination. 
Otherwise, the procedure was the same as in the previous experiment. 
These conditions were blocked, and observers were informed of 
the stimulus and test locations at the start of each block. The 
sequence of blocks was counterbalanced across observers. Within 
each of these four stimulus–test combinations (test was on the 
same side: LL, RR; test was on the other side: LR, RL), the target 
picture appeared in Serial Positions 1, 2, and 3 of the initial 
presentation equally often, yielding three trials per cell of the 
design. Across observers, every picture appeared in each of these 
conditions equally often. Each observer in Experiment 3a was 
tested with only one of the three masked intervals (42, 100, and 
250 ms), with 36 observers being tested with each masked interval. 
In Experiment 3b, only the 42-ms condition was tested, and 
maintaining fixation during stimulus presentation was defined as 
keeping gaze within a 4.4° x 4.4° square surrounding the initial 
fixation location until the test picture’s onset. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Again, observers tended to be rather confident of their responses. 
On average, the percentages of “sure,” “pretty sure,” and 
“not sure” responses were 26%, 56%, and 16%, respectively. 
Observers failed to recognize pictures on only 2% of the trials, and 
these were excluded from all analyses. Separate ANOVAs conducted 
on observers’ mean boundary ratings on maintain-fixation 
and shift-gaze trials revealed no main effect of side of stimulus 
presentation and no interaction with serial position in either condition 
in either experiment (all Fs < 1.66, ns). Mean boundary 
ratings in each of these conditions were subsequently collapsed 
across the factor of side of stimulus presentation in both experiments. 
Experiment 3a: Serial Position 3. Again, the critical condition 
for observing time course is when the target is in the final 
position in the sequence. Replicating Experiment 2, when fixation 
was maintained, boundary extension occurred for the final 
picture at each masked interval. The mean boundary ratings and 
95% confidence intervals are shown in Figure 6 (left panel). 
This provides additional evidence to suggest that boundary 
extension occurred rapidly enough following stimulus offset to 
be present in transsaccadic memory. BE for the final picture in 
the sequence also survived a gaze shift for all masked intervals 
tested. The mean boundary ratings and 95% confidence intervals 
for shift-gaze trials are shown in Figure 6 (right panel). 






Figure 6. Observers’ mean boundary ratings for maintain-fixation trials are shown on the left, and mean 
boundary ratings for shift-gaze trials are shown on the right, for each serial position of the target at each 
retention interval (Experiment 3a). Error bars show the 95% confidence interval of the mean. Means that 
are significantly less than zero reflect boundary extension; means that are significantly greater than zero 




In the maintain-fixation condition, planned comparisons among 
all three masked intervals showed that when fixation was maintained, 
the mean rating for Serial Position 3 targets at the 42-ms 
masked interval was significantly smaller than both the mean 
rating for Serial Position 3 targets at the 100-ms interval (–.08 vs. 
–.25), t(70) = 2.73, p < .05, and the mean rating for those at the 
250-ms interval (–.08 vs. –.36), t(70) = 4.22, p < .05. 
Experiment 3a: Serial Positions 1 and 2. As in Experiments 1 
and 2, boundary extension was not eliminated by conceptual 
masking. As can be seen from the 95% confidence intervals for 
maintain-fixation trials (Figure 6, left panel) and shift-gaze trials 
(Figure 6, right panel), targets that appeared in Serial Positions 1 
and 2 yielded significant boundary extension. In the context of 
visual scanning, this is important because the contents of each new 
fixation would serve as a conceptual mask for the contents of the 
previous one. 
Experiment 3b: Oculomotor data. Boundary extension occurred 
for targets in all three serial positions in both conditions, as 
is shown in Figure 7. The eye tracking data revealed that observers 
maintained fixation during stimulus presentation on 84% of 
maintain-fixation trials and 79% of shift-gaze trials. An ANOVA 
comparing observers’ mean boundary ratings for all trials with 
mean ratings for only trials on which fixation was maintained 
revealed no changes in data patterns (all Fs < 1). Thus, observers 
were following instructions, rather than adopting a strategy of 
fixating near an edge instead of at the center of the stimuli. 
The eye tracking data also revealed that the average retention 
interval on shift-gaze trials, defined as the time between the offset 
of the final scene in the RSVP sequence and the beginning of the 
first fixation on the test picture, was 370 ms. This interval can be 
divided into three components: the masked interval (during which 
fixation was maintained; 42 ms) the saccade latency (the time 
required to initiate the saccade following test picture onset; 264 
ms), and the saccade duration (64 ms). Leftward and rightward 
saccade latencies did not differ significantly (255 ms vs. 273 ms), 
t(35) = 1.29, ns, nor did the corresponding retention intervals for 
left-side or right-side test items (360 ms vs. 381 ms), t(35) = 1.44, 
ns. Thus the time required for observers to shift gaze to the test 
picture on shift-gaze trials was only slightly longer than typical 
saccade latencies, which are considered to be in the area of 
150–200 ms (Carpenter, 1988; Rayner, 1998). This suggests that 
observers were neither delaying saccades to test pictures nor 
initiating them prior to the test picture’s onset. 
 
In conclusion, the results of Experiments 3a and 3b show that 
boundary extension would, at the least, be available to play a role 
in the integration of successive views and that it is clearly robust 
enough to survive a shift in gaze following a dynamic series of 





Boundary extension is an error of commission. One usually 
thinks of such errors as emerging over relatively long periods of 
time or under conditions of high memory load. In the present 
experiments we demonstrated that an interruption of a view for as 
little as 42 ms was sufficient to elicit boundary extension. In these 
cases observers misidentified the identical view as looking more 
close-up than the view seen before the interruption. Across experiments, 
we tested memory for target pictures embedded in rapidly 
presented streams of three pictures followed by a masked interval 
of 1 s, 625 ms, 250 ms, 100 ms, or 42 ms. Boundary extension 
occurred following all of these intervals and did so irrespective of 





Figure 7. Observers’ mean boundary ratings for maintain-fixation trials are shown on the left, and mean 
boundary ratings for shift-gaze trials are shown on the right, for each serial position (SP) of the target 
(Experiment 3b). Error bars show the 95% confidence interval of the mean. Means that are significantly 






At the outset we had expected that an early visual memory 
buffer, perhaps iconic memory (which can sometimes persist in 
spite of a mask; Smithson & Mollon, 2006) or VSTM, might 
prevent the involvement of boundary extension in the earliest 
phases of visual scanning, but clearly, at least in the presence of a 
disruptive mask, boundary extension was evident following an 
interval commensurate with a saccade. In addition, in all three 
experiments, boundary extension occurred for pictures that appeared 
in Serial Positions 1 and 2, suggesting that conceptual 
masking, caused by the immediate onset of new, meaningful visual 
information, does not eliminate boundary extension (Intraub, 1984, 
1999; Potter, 1976, 1999). 
 
Experiments 1, 3a, and 3b demonstrated that this early, potentially 
fragile memory of an extended view was robust enough to 
survive a shift in gaze. This is important because it shows that 
neither the attention shift nor motor planning involved in this act 
disrupted what was, for the most part, a rather confidently held 
assessment that the original view had been more expansive. This 
occurred both when observers knew exactly where the test picture 
would appear (Experiments 3a and 3b) and when they had no 
advance warning and the test picture’s spatial position shifted 
randomly across trials (Experiment 1). These experiments exploited 
one of the most striking characteristics of boundary extension— 
the failure to recognize an identical close-up view. 
 
Experiment 2 provided converging evidence for the occurrence 
of boundary extension by testing for additional patterns of results 
that are diagnostic of boundary extension under conditions in 
which observers maintained fixation. Observers were presented 
with close-up or more wide-angle views, and test pictures were 
either identical to the target or showed the alternate view (e.g., 
Gottesman & Intraub, 2002; Intraub et al., 1992, 1998; Intraub & 
Richardson, 1989). As in the other experiments, repetition of the 
same close-up at presentation and test was not recognized, as 
observers tended to think the repetition was more “close-up.” 
However, it also showed that repetition of the same wider angle 
views resulted in less boundary extension than had been obtained 
for the repeated close-ups and that a robust asymmetry occurred 
for trials on which a different view was shown at test. These 
patterns occurred not only for the last position in the sequence but 
across all serial positions, again demonstrating that boundary extension 
was not eliminated by conceptual masking (Intraub, 1984, 
1999; Potter, 1976, 1999). 
 
To test the early time course of boundary extension it was 
necessary to follow a target picture with the test picture, so of 
course our test conditions did not provide a simulation of what 
usually happens during visual scanning in which the image 
changes with each saccade. It is important to note, however, that 
our test provides an even stronger test of boundary extension for 
that very reason. Given that boundary extension occurred both 
when the same picture repeated and when the observer could 
control an eye movement with full knowledge that spatial memory 
would be tested, it is reasonable to conclude that boundary extension 
is, at the very least, available early enough in processing to 
play a role in view integration during active visual scanning. 
 
 
Implications for Transsaccadic Memory and Scene 
Representation 
 
Most researchers agree that scene representation is not picturelike 
but instead is more schematic in nature (e.g., Henderson & 
Hollingworth, 2003; Hochberg, 1978; Intraub, 1997; Simons & 
Levin, 1997; Simons & Rensink, 2005). The schematic character 
of representation has also been posited specifically in the case of 
transsaccadic memory (Carlson-Radvansky, 1999; Carlson- 
Radvansky & Irwin, 1995; Irwin, 1991, 1992; Verfaillie & De 
Graef, 2000; Verfaillie et al., 1994). Research has demonstrated 
that scene layout is obtained rapidly and that in addition to conveying 
a rough portrait of scene structure, it supports scene comprehension 
at a conceptual level (Biederman, 1981; Oliva & 
Schyns, 1997). The present research demonstrates that not only is 
some characterization of layout maintained in transsaccadic memory 
but that this representation includes a projection of the layout 
beyond the bounds of the original sensory information. The rapidity 
of this effect is striking. 
 
Although it is assumed that some representation of layout is 
retained above and beyond the individual details of a view (e.g., 
Rensink, 2000), the current experiments provide evidence that it is 
retained within transsaccadic memory as well. This adds to our 
knowledge of the transsaccadic representation because most research 
in that area has focused primarily on important issues of 
object representation. For example, several studies have addressed 
the number of objects (Irwin, 1991, 1992; Irwin & Andrews, 1996) 
and the types of object properties (Gordon & Irwin, 1996; Henderson, 
1997; Henderson & Siefert, 1999, 2001) that can be 
maintained across a saccade. There has also been research on 
spatial relations that are maintained across a saccade, both among 
parts of the same object (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1995; 
Verfaillie & De Graef, 2000) and between multiple objects 
(Carlson-Radvansky, 1999; Deubel, 2004; Germeys et al., 2004). 
The current research suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that a visual 
interruption lasting the duration of a saccade is enough time for 
boundary extension to occur. 
 
The extended region is very constrained, perhaps enough to 
prime upcoming layout (Sanocki, 2003) but not so much that we 
confabulate and become confused during visual scanning. This 
unidirectional boundary error might better be classified as a highly 
constrained prediction rather than an error. After all, the goal of 
the visual system is to construct a coherent representation of the 
surrounding visual world, in spite of the fact that scene perception 
is built from a succession of samples over time. Successive fixations 
embellish the representation with more detailed information 
(Hollingworth, 2004; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2002; Melcher, 
2001, 2006; Zelinsky & Loschky, 2005). But the location of view 
boundaries is not among those details. It is more adaptive for the 
visual system to “ignore” these spurious boundaries and extrapolate 






Implications for the Locus of Boundary Extension 
 
Having more clearly charted boundary extension’s early time 
course, we return to our original question: At what stage of 
processing of a given view does boundary extension occur— 
perception or memory? Finding evidence for boundary extension 
in memory following a 42-ms gap in sensory input suggests that 
boundary extension occurs within the span of a single saccade— 
perhaps as soon as sensory input is removed. What implications do 
these findings have for the locus of boundary extension? Is there a 
“process” of extrapolation that rapidly takes place in memory 
during the brief gap between fixations? A more likely possibility is 
that the first step of the creation of a boundary-extended view 
involves processes taking place during sensory perception (i.e., 
while the sensory information is present). Here it is important to 
entertain the role of amodal perception and higher order expectation 
in scene perception. The layout and gist of a scene are grasped 
very rapidly—requiring only a brief glimpse (less than the duration 
of a typical fixation; Biederman, 1981; Intraub, 1981; Oliva & 
Schyns, 1997; Potter, 1976; Thorpe, Fize, & Marlot, 1996). 
Amodal perception of surfaces (Kellman, Yin, & Shipley, 1998; 
Yin, Kellman, & Shipley, 1997, 2000) and objects (Kanizsa, 1979) 
that are cropped by the edges of the view would be expected to 
occur simultaneously. Thus, while the stimulus is visible, the 
observer’s representation includes both the sensory information 
contained in the view and the unseen layout beyond its edges. 
 
While the stimulus is in view, the observer can readily note 
where the periphery of the picture terminates and the amodally 
generated part of the representation begins. Once the sensory input 
is gone, however, the distinction between what was sensory and 
what was amodal is no longer clear. The representation of the 
highly expected, amodally generated region just beyond the view 
may be mistaken as having been seen, thus resulting in boundary 
extension. In a sense then, the boundary-extended region is already 
a part of the representation before the stimulus is gone (albeit an 
amodal part). Only without sensory input is it mistaken for having 
been seen. Thus, we observed boundary extension in Experiments 
2, 3a, and 3b under extremely artificial conditions that would be 
expected to support a far better memory representation than what 
would be expected under normal visual scanning. When fixation 
was maintained, boundary extension occurred following a 42-ms 
break in the sensory input when the identical view appeared in the 
same spatial location. 
 
In conclusion, this series of experiments demonstrates the likelihood 
that boundary extension is available in transsaccadic memory 
early enough to help place each successive view in its larger 
spatial framework (Intraub, 2002; Intraub et al., 1992) and to play 
a role in the integration of successive views. It is well accepted that 
transsaccadic memory does not retain a point-by-point representation 
of the world. The current research shows that the transsaccadic 
representation of expanse is not simply a vague representation 
that fluctuates with random error. Instead, the spatial 
representation includes a constructive unidirectional error that 
would serve as a good prediction of the continuity of layout. We 
suggest that this rapid projection of layout may be one of the 
means by which the visual system supports perception of a continuous, 
coherent world that can never be seen all at once but must 
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